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Shielding Board Members: 
Municipalities Should Protect Them From Suits 
 
Written for Publication in the New York Law Journal 
August 18, 2004 
 
 
John R. Nolon and Jessica A. Bacher 
 
[John Nolon is a Professor at Pace University School of Law, Counsel for the 
Land Use Law Center, and Visiting Professor at Yale’s School of Forestry and 
Environmental Studies.  Jessica Bacher is an Adjunct Professor at Pace 
University School of Law and a Staff Attorney for the Land Use Law Center.] 
 
Abstract: Both individual land use board members and the municipal 
governments containing these boards are concerned with the liability of the 
boards, and of individual members from legal challenges stemming from their 
decisions.  Legal actions against these boards, and the potential for subsequent 
liability of individual members could put significant financial burdens on 
municipalities and also discourage competent citizens from serving on these 
local land use boards.  This commentary reviews the impact of two recent New 
York state cases, and their affect on state legislation concerning these topics.   
 
*** 
 
In Bower Associates v. Town of Pleasant Valley, No. 2004-49 and Home 
Depot, U.S.A. Inc. v. Dunn, No. 2004-50, N.Y. LEXIS 1046 (N.Y. May 13, 2004), 
developers sought millions in damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the costs 
associated with allegedly arbitrary delays in the project review process.  In a joint 
opinion, the Court of Appeals found no constitutional violations and dismissed 
both cases.   
 
Home Depot filed its civil rights action against the Mayor and City Council 
members in their official and individual capacities seeking compensatory and 
punitive damages.  The exposure of citizen members of land use review boards 
to this type of action raises serious concerns that can have negative ramifications 
for the land use system.  At the Land Use Law Center at Pace Law School, we 
have trained hundreds of local land use officials and have heard this concern 
expressed repeatedly.  These two cases provide an opportunity to review the 
extent of their vulnerability to such actions and the methods used by 
municipalities to protect them.   
 
Bower Associates v. Town of Pleasant Valley 
 
In Bower Associates v. Town of Pleasant Valley, the Town wrongfully 
denied Bower Associates, a housing developer, the requisite permits to build a 
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three home subdivision and an access road to this and another 189 unit 
subdivision in neighboring Poughkeepsie.  Although Pleasant Valley cited 
environmental concerns related to the Poughkeepsie subdivision, the Appellate 
Division held that the Board’s denial was arbitrary, the project met all conditions 
necessary for approval, and the denial was based on community pressure.  
Armed with the court’s decision, Bower Associates commenced a civil rights 
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking two million dollars in damages against the 
Town of Pleasant Valley and its Planning Board for denial of procedural and 
substantive due process, equal protection, and just compensation. 
 
 
Home Depot, U.S.A. Inc. v. Dunn 
 
In Home Depot, U.S.A. Inc. v. Dunn, Home Depot applied for site plan 
approval to develop a retail establishment in the Village of Port Chester.  As an 
“interested agency” in the environmental review process, the neighboring City of 
Rye demanded four traffic-mitigating measures.  In response, Port Chester made 
one of these measures, the widening of the Midland Avenue in Rye, a condition 
on the site plan approval.  Because Midland Avenue is a county road within Rye, 
approvals from both Westchester County and Rye were necessary to comply 
with the condition.  Thus, without Rye’s approval, Home Depot could not 
proceed.   
 
Rye refused to consent to the permit and Home Depot commenced a 
lawsuit to compel Rye to sign the permit and for damages from the Mayor and 
the City Council members under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Home Depot sought fifty 
million dollars in compensatory damages and unspecified punitive damages, for 
the delay in construction.  The court held that Rye’s insistence on the traffic 
mitigation measure and then its refusal to approve the permit was arbitrary and 
capricious.  During the proceedings, Home Depot’s site plan approval expired.  
After a third environmental review, Port Chester approved the site plan without 
the condition to widen Midland Avenue.  Home Depot’s civil rights action for the 
arbitrary delay in this approval proceeded to the Court of Appeals.      
  
 
Holding 
 
 In both cases, the Court of Appeals concluded that there was no 
constitutional violation and dismissed the developers’ complaints.  “The point is 
simply that denial of a permit—even an arbitrary denial redressable by an article 
78 or other state law proceeding—is not tantamount to a constitutional violation 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; significantly more is required.”  Bower Associates v. 
Town of Pleasant Valley, No. 2004-49, No. 2004-50, 2004 N.Y. LEXIS 1046, at 
*9-*10 (N.Y. May 13, 2004).  According to the court, § 1983 “is not simply an 
additional vehicle for judicial review of land-use determination.”  Id., at *9. 
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Substantive Due Process 
 
“In the land-use context, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 protects against municipal 
actions that violate a property owner’s rights to due process, equal protection of 
the laws and just compensation for the taking of property under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United State Constitution.”  Id. (citing Town of 
Orangetown v. Magee, 665 N.E.2d 1061 (N.Y. 1996)).  “Both cases … center on 
alleged deprivation of substantive due process.”  Id.  Substantive due process 
cases are traditionally brought in federal court and in the context of land use 
have been addressed by the Court of Appeals only once, in Town of Orangetown 
v. Magee.  In 1996, the Town of Orangetown sought to terminate the 
development of an industrial park which had been granted a building permit.  As 
work on the large commercial project progressed, community opposition to the 
building became organized and political.  The resistance was so serious that the 
Town Supervisor eventually directed the building inspector to revoke the 
developer’s permit.  Although the Town presented a series of defenses for its 
actions, the Court of Appeals held that the revocation of the permit was only an 
effort to satisfy political concerns and therefore not legal.  Such an action, taken 
without a reasonable basis in fact, is arbitrary and capricious and violates the 
developer’s due process rights and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  The developer in this case 
was awarded five million dollars, in addition to legal fees and expenses, for the 
illegal revocation of its building permit.  See Town of Orangetown, 665 N.E.2d 
1061.   
 
In Magee, the Court of Appeals established a two-part test for substantive 
due process violations.  Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Board of Regents 
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), the claimant must first demonstrate a legitimate 
claim of entitlement to the property right in question.  “The key to determining the 
existence of a property interest is the extent to which the deciding authority may 
exercise discretion in reaching its decision, rather than the estimate of the 
likelihood of a certain decision.”  Penlyn Dev. Corp. v. Incorporated Village of 
Lloyd Harbor, 51 F. Supp. 2d 255, 261 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing Crowley v. 
Courville, 76 F. 3d 47, 52 (2d Cir. 1996)).  Second, even when it is shown that a 
demonstrable property interest has been denied, the claimant must demonstrate 
that the “governmental action was wholly without legal justification.”  Bower 
Associates, 2004 N.Y. LEXIS 1046, at *11.   
 
The two-part test strikes an appropriate balance between the role of 
local governments in regulatory matters affecting the health, 
welfare and safety of their citizens, and the protection of 
constitutional rights at the very outer margins of municipal behavior.  
It represents an acknowledgment that decisions on matters of local 
concern should ordinarily be made by those whom local residents 
select to represent them in municipal government.  Id., at *14 
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The Magees satisfied both of these requirements.  They established that 
their right to develop the land had vested under state law: they had expended 
substantial sums on the project, obtained a valid permit to build, and had 
completed substantial construction on the land.  In addition, they proved that the 
Town’s actions were without legal justification and were motivated entirely by 
political concerns.   
 
Bower Associates and Home Depot failed to establish either factor.  
Where the land use review board has discretion in approving or denying the 
application, entitlement can only be established when approval is “virtually 
assured.”  Id., at *13.  Neither Bower Associates nor Home Depot, unlike the 
Magees, could show that the boards’ discretion to approve the actions had been 
so circumscribed as to create a clear entitlement to approval.  A victory in an 
article 78 proceeding does not remove all further discretion from the board 
sufficiently to establish a constitutionally protected property interest.  “As for the 
second element of the test, ‘only the most egregious official conduct can be said 
to be arbitrary in the constitutional sense.’”  Id., at *13 (quoting City of Cuyahoga 
Falls v. Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found., 538 U.S. 188 (2003)).  The court found this 
egregious conduct lacking on the part of Rye and Pleasant Valley. 
 
 
Individual Liability for Board Members 
 
Home Depot filed its claim not only against the City, but also against the 
Mayor and the City Council members both personally and officially.  Unlike the 
Bower Associates, Home Depot filed the civil rights action at the same time that it 
brought its article 78 action to compel Rye to sign the permit; not with its article 
78 relief in hand.  A few months before filing its claims, Home Depot sent a letter 
threatening the damages action unless Rye signed the county permit.  An 
interoffice memorandum was cited to show that Home Depot saw the § 1983 
action as leverage against Rye for settlement.  Id., at *6.  Implicitly, the company 
thought that the threat of board member liability would give it leverage in forcing 
a positive decision on its application.   
 
This type of action raises many concerns among local land use board 
members as to whether and to what extent they are liable for their board’s 
actions in such cases.  Further, they are anxious to know what their 
municipalities can do to protect them from any liability they may incur.  A 
municipality can choose to defend and indemnify local officials, including board 
members, under § 18 of the New York State Public Officers Law.  N.Y. PUB. OFF. 
LAW 18 (3)(a).  When § 18 was proposed by the New York Law Revision 
Commission it stated that it would “be difficult for many public entities to attract 
and keep competent public officers and employees," particularly those employed 
by small municipalities "where the compensation is minimal or nonexistent."  New 
York Law Revision Comm'n, Memorandum Relating to Indemnification and 
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Defense of Public Officers and Employees, 204th Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1981), 
(reprinted in 1981 N.Y. Laws 2314).  The Commission further found that 
"government cannot effectively function without some assurance that its 
members will not be called upon to personally defend themselves against claims 
arising out of the daily operation of the government or to account in damages 
therefor.”  Id. 
 
Under § 18, the municipality has the duty to provide for the defense 
against any “civil action or proceeding, state or federal, arising out of any alleged 
act or omission which occurred or allegedly occurred while the employee was 
acting within the scope of his public employment or duties.”  N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW 
18 (3)(a).  The municipality is required to pay litigation expenses and reasonable 
attorneys’ fees.  In addition, § 18 provides that the municipality shall indemnify 
and save harmless officers for any judgment obtained or settlement that the 
municipality has approved in such actions.  Section 18 does not authorize a 
municipality to indemnify a local official for punitive or exemplary damages.   
 
A local government may supplement the provisions of § 18 and provide 
indemnification for punitive damages.  N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW 18(4)(C).  The City of 
Rye provides its public officers with the full benefits of § 18.  RYE, N.Y., CODE  § 
145-2.  In addition, Rye specifically provides indemnification for punitive and 
exemplary damages in any civil action or proceeding in which it is alleged that 
the officer or employee has violated the civil rights of the claimant under Section 
1981 and 1983 of the Civil Rights Act provided that the officer was “acting in 
good faith and within the scope of his public employment, powers and duties.”  
RYE, N.Y., CODE  § 145-3.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Local board members should investigate whether the benefits of § 18 and 
further protection from punitive damage awards have been made available by 
their municipalities through measures such as those adopted by the City of Rye.  
Municipalities, in order to recruit local land use board members and enable them 
to make sound decisions in the community’s interest should afford such 
protections.  Further, they should be certain that their municipal insurance 
policies cover the costs of the defense of actions and the payment of any 
judgments awarded.   
 
In such cases, actions such as that brought by Home Depot will not be 
effective to force settlement out of fear of liability.  On their part, local officials are 
advised to protect themselves from the anxiety of lawsuit and the cost of litigation 
by avoiding arbitrary actions in reviewing and approving land use applications.  
